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Abstract 
The chapter examines the various ways that data captures and colonizes minds, souls, bodies 
and spaces and makes data subjects through practices of production, accumulation, 
aggregation, circulation, valuation, and interpretation. We draw attention to how these practices 
operate together yet differently in the metropole and postcolony and produce different data 
subjects. By first describing how European empires in the nineteenth century invented various 
data collection and analysis methods for producing colonial populations, the chapter outlines 
how postcolonial practices build on these imperial infrastructures and logics. Through the 
example of the UN’s Global Pulse initiative as an instance of postcolonial data politics, the 
chapter argues for decolonising data politics. 
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Postcolonial data politics   
This chapter addresses a question that is rarely, if at all, raised about the ways in which data 
politics plays out differently in colonial, postcolonial, and imperial states and their respective 
force in international relations (Kumar 2017, Burbank and Cooper 2010, Muldoon 1999, Gilroy 
2004). The chapter makes a case for a distinct ‘postcolonial data politics’ to draw attention to 
how data politics plays out differently in the Global South than the Global North.  We develop 
this case by first examining its conditions of possibility: the colonial power and knowledge 
(institutions, disciplines, objects and subjects) that constituted and continue to shape 
postcolonial states and their relationships with imperial states. One such condition that we 
exemplify is how the quest for a British imperial census in the nineteenth century and its 
technologies of colonial government of counting, categorising, and ordering were inherited, 
reshaped, and reused by postcolonial governments. Understanding the constitutive force of this 
genealogy is key to interpreting how the vast amounts of data collected through the internet 
and devices continues yet reconfigures colonial logics and objects of knowledge.  
In the second edition of Imagined Communities (1991) Benedict Anderson concludes that he 
was ‘hasty’ and ‘superficial’ in the original edition (1983) in assuming that twentieth-century 
postcolonial states were modelled after modern nineteenth-century European states (2006, 
163). He suggests that to understand nationalism in postcolonial states, its genealogy should be 
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traced to colonial governments instituted by imperial powers before the nineteenth century. He 
thinks that it is necessary to understand ‘imaginings of the colonial state’. He admits that ‘this 
conclusion may seem surprising, since colonial states were typically anti-nationalist, and often 
violently so. But if one looks beneath colonial ideologies and policies to the grammar in which, 
from the mid nineteenth century, they were deployed, the lineage becomes decidedly more 
clear’ (2006, 163). For students of colonialism and imperialism, neither the proposition that 
postcolonial states inherited practices from colonial institutions nor that imperial states 
transplanted practices from colonial governments – something that Michel Foucault (2003, 
103) had identified in 1975 as a ‘return’ effect – would come as a surprise. 
Anderson argued that this genealogy was expressed and deployed most prominently in three 
colonial institutions: the census, the map, and the museum: ‘together’, he says, ‘they 
profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion – the nature of 
the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry’ 
(2006, 163). His analysis of each institution in imperial states that colonised Southeast Asia 
have been widely discussed as well as his claim that its lessons should have comparative value 
as it includes territories colonised by the all ‘white’ imperial powers of Britain, France, Spain, 
Portugal, The Netherlands, and the United States (Cordell, Ittmann, and Maddox 2010, 
Christopher 2009, 2008, Appadurai 1993).  
Anderson's analyses of the census (population), the map (territory), and the museum (memory) 
are pertinent for the argument we want to make in this chapter. As modes of knowledge, 
especially the census and the map, were not merely descriptive exercises that represented 
populations and territories but were performative technologies that literally produced them. As 
James Scott says, maps ‘were … not just maps. Rather, they were maps that, when allied with 
state power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be remade. Thus a state cadastral 
map created to designate taxable property-holders does not merely describe a system of land 
tenure; it creates such a system through its ability to give its categories the force of law’ (J.C. 
Scott 1999, 3). If the map was not merely a representation of a given territory,  it came to 
constitute territory as an object of power: possession and dominion were synonyms of the 
colony. The same can be said about both the census and the museum. They were not merely 
representations of ‘population’ and ‘memory’ but practices through which they became objects 
of power. This was of course compellingly developed by Bernard Cohn (1996) in his studies 
of British imperial government in India. On the census Anderson largely focused on the 
production of ethnic and racial categories and how they helped shape the imagination of the 
nation constituted by the very categories imperial powers instituted. 
It should be said that it is not only that the will to power and knowledge mobilised the census 
but also the constitutive performative force of that which it produced: population. The 
enormous amount of data collected, collated, interpreted, analysed, and disseminated about the 
colonies provided the ways in which the dominions and possessions were imagined in the sense 
Anderson always maintained: as produced. This is the performative sense in which the data 
produced about an object at the same time exceeds its will to power and attains constitutive 
powers in shaping and forming that object. This is certainly the sense in which Edward Said's 
(2003) critique of orientalism as a discourse – practical, academic, and literary – constituting 
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the orient specially but the colony generally highlighted. As Young puts it ‘Said’s use of the 
notion of a discourse to demonstrate the way in which forms of knowledge were constructed 
within a particular kind of language, which in turn was replete with all sorts of cultural 
assumptions, enabled Orientalism, and colonialism more generally, to be analysed as an 
ideological production across different kinds of texts produced historically from a wide range 
of different institutions, disciplines and geographical areas’ (Young 2016, 385). 
The most important lesson we have learned from political sociology and anthropology of 
empires is that while an empire that embodies a will to power may come to pass and its mode 
of dominion or possession may become postcolonial, the constitutive powers of knowledge 
(institutions, disciplines, objects and subjects) continue to shape postcolonial states and their 
relationships with imperial states. Conversely, modern European empires never developed 
knowledge-power practices in isolation from their metropoles. Thus, we use the terms colonial, 
postcolonial and imperial states to highlight their genealogy and insist on using ‘empire’ neither 
as ubiquitous and omnipresent nor as a geographically contiguous and historically homogenous 
form of rule (Kumar 2010). Rather, we use ‘empire’ to signify a form of rule whose 
performativity constitutes power relations between dominant and dominated institutions and as 
such can be geographically dispersed and historically heterogeneous (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1999). 
Our argument is that the continuing and constitutive powers of knowledge (of population, of 
territory, and of memory) should have significant bearing on how we now think about the vast 
amounts of data collected through the internet and devices that are said to usher in a new era 
of data politics. We argue in this chapter that postcolonial data politics should be a distinct 
domain of analysis by focusing on how colonial dominions and possessions are now being 
reconfigured as objects of knowledge. We develop this argument in three stages. In the 
following section, we focus especially on the British Empire and its massive efforts to establish 
an imperial census beginning from the 1840s to the 1940s. This is to illustrate how the census 
represented a mode of data politics that produced colonial populations as objects of power. 
Then we will focus on two cases from contemporary data politics where postcolonial states are 
being increasingly brought under the orbit of massive data collection, collation, and 
interpretation regimes by new kinds of authorities whose mode may not be imperial yet whose 
form of rule distinctly is. Then we will conclude with some thoughts on resistances to data’s 
empire and possibilities of decolonising data politics.  
Governing peoples: biopolitics and empire 
There has been a lively debate on empires over the last twenty years. There is no doubt that 
this debate owes a great deal to Said’s Orientalism (2003) and Culture and Imperialism (1994) 
– two books that shaped and framed the subsequent field of postcolonial studies (Young 2016). 
Perhaps counterintuitively, postcolonial studies opened up, amongst other things, the 
possibility of understanding the continuity between colonial and postcolonial states and the 
role of imperial states (those states that established conquered or settler colonies and 
dominions). What Anderson called his oversight – that he did not originally see the relation 
between colonial and postcolonial states, regarding the latter’s nationalism as the negation of 
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the former – is indeed an insight that arises strongly from postcolonial studies. It has been now 
widely debated that rather than ‘disappearing’ especially European empires have taken on new 
forms. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper (2010) have, for example, entirely shifted the 
ground by comparatively investigating empires as ongoing forms of rule for governing peoples 
and populations. Similarly, Krishnan Kumar (2017) focused on five world empires and their 
continuing presence in the contemporary world. To be sure, the conclusion to draw from this 
burgeoning debate and the shifting ground is not that ‘empires are alive and well’ but that 
empire is a changing form of rule that shapes global population management and creates 
evolving forms of subject peoples (Hevia 2012, Ittmann, Cordell, and Maddox 2010, Pagden 
2001, Steinmetz 2013). Within postcolonial studies the terms metropole and postcolony or ‘the 
Global North’ and ‘the Global South’ are used to indicate a deterritorialised geography where 
‘Souths in the geographic North and Norths in the geographic South’ are entangled (Mahler 
2018, 19, Mbembe 2001). It is in this deterritorialised sense that we adopt the terms metropole, 
colony and postcolony when referring to empire as a form of rule. 
There is so much more to say than we can in this chapter about this debate but we will briefly 
draw out its significance for our argument for a postcolonial data politics. We want to illustrate 
this by first returning to Michel Foucault who not only influenced figures such as Edward Said 
and postcolonial studies but also inaugurated ‘population’ as an object of modern government 
– understood as a broad concern with the administration of things and people. Yet, as Anne 
Stoler (1995) famously argued, with the exception of a brief note on the ‘return effect’ that we 
have mentioned above, Foucault did not concern himself with colonial government let alone 
colonial technologies of power such as the census, the map, or the museum in the colony (D. 
Scott 1995). One would have expected that studies on ‘colonial government’ and especially the 
colonial census and the production of colonial populations would have flourished, but this 
happened only to a limited extent and there are not many studies of colonial populations and 
their principles of production especially in the context of imperial government (Cordell, 
Ittmann, and Maddox 2010, Christopher 2008, Ittmann, Cordell, and Maddox 2010). Early 
studies have not been followed through with detailed investigations especially outside India 
(Cohn 1996, Appadurai 1993, Ludden 1993, Kalpagam 2000b). It is well worth then revisiting 
Foucault (albeit briefly) on population, draw out the relations between biopolitics and ‘data 
politics’ as we see it, and provide an overview of the British Empire’s attempts at creating an 
imperial census as a prologue to postcolonial data politics. 
In his Collège de France lectures on Society Must be Defended (1975-1976) and Population, 
Security, Territory (1977-1978), Michel Foucault (2007, 2003) outlines what he sees as the 
specificity of modern government. The publication of these lectures (in English) nearly twenty 
years after their delivery has been a revelation for those who took the last chapter of his History 
of Sexuality (1978) as a ground-breaking attempt to identify the specificity of modern 
government. In these lectures he more clearly outlines how he thinks the concept of government 
acquires a broad meaning in the sixteenth century when the verb ‘to govern’ functions in a 
wide range of domains to indicate any benevolent or prescriptive activity to command the 
movements and subsistence of people (2007, 122). Foucault concludes that ‘one thing clearly 
emerges through all these meanings, which is that one never governs a state, a territory, or a 
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political structure. Those whom one governs are people, individuals, or groups’ (2007, 122). 
The target and object of government is always a people, individuals, or groups. Yet, at this 
point, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, governing peoples is a sovereign exercise: it 
is direct, violent, and unforgiving.   
Foucault argues that by the second half of the eighteenth century a new form of power adds 
another meaning of government, which he eventually calls ‘disciplinary’. He does not think 
that ‘sovereign’ and ‘disciplinary’ mechanisms of power are to be juxtaposed against each 
other. Rather, these two mechanisms of power work with different rationalities. Still, this is 
probably not the most original argument of Foucault. It is when he becomes aware that toward 
the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a new mechanism of power emerges. 
In a much-quoted statement Foucault says ‘unlike discipline, which is addressed to bodies, the 
new non-disciplinary power is applied not to human-as-body but to the living human, to 
human-as-living-being; ultimately, if you like, to human-as-species’ (Foucault 2003, 242). If 
disciplinary power is concerned with the function, movement, and fitness of the body, 
regulatory power is concerned with the birth, death and health of the species-body. Foucault 
calls this emerging regime of regulatory mechanisms of power that are concerned with the 
species-body as biopolitics—so-called because of its concern with natality, mortality, and 
fertility (Foucault 2003, 243). If then the body is the problem of disciplines, then population 
becomes the problem of regulation (Foucault 2003, 245).  The key argument Foucault makes 
is that although population was an object of power and knowledge before the late-eighteenth 
century, it became an object of management that required new techniques of data collection 
(e.g., census) and new methods of analysis (e.g., demography, statistics). Although Foucault is 
not always consistent, we do not think that he offers these three logics of government – 
sovereignty, discipline, and regulation – as supplanting or displacing each other but that the 
specificity of modern government consists in their multiple and intersecting deployments 
appropriate to each target of government.  
Of course, much has been debated over Foucault's lectures especially on territory, population, 
and security over the last decade or so and we do not aim to discuss the main issues of 
agreement and disagreement. From our perspective we want to note that despite the substantial 
debate over Foucault's claims about early modern and modern European states when European 
empires were also accumulating territories, creating populations and advancing competing 
claims over (and warring for) sovereignties in the colonies, his claims remain crucial for 
understanding the development of colonial government (Curtis 2004, Kalpagam 2000a, 2001, 
D. Scott 1995, Wilson 2011). What Ian Hacking (2015) identified as the avalanche of printed 
numbers between the 1820s and 1840s when ‘population’ was invented is precisely the period 
in which British imperial government identified its colonial populations differently. We want 
to illustrate this briefly with the efforts to conduct an imperial census during the British Empire. 
Consistent with Foucault’s claim that population becomes a new kind of object of government 
in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, the British Empire had a renewed interest 
in its colonial dominions and possessions and news ways of accounting for them. As Foucault 
would also emphasise, this was not the first time states had an interest in their populations but 
their modes of accumulating data about them signalled something different. A.J. Christopher 
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traces the quest for a census of the British Empire from 1840 to 1940. He argues that mapping 
and the census were the two most important enquiries undertaken by the empire. The quest for 
an imperial census actually starts somewhat earlier, in 1801, when a decennial enumeration of 
the United Kingdom was instituted and when a question emerged about how to count colonies 
in this enumeration. How to act at a distance to govern unfamiliar events, places, and people 
for the empire was eventually resolved with the census as a technology of knowledge 
production. As Christopher says ‘as such it represents a significant attempt by the state to 
number and assess the population and its characteristics and so obtain a view of the society it 
seeks to govern’ (Christopher 2008, 269).   
This idea of an imperial census was put forward in the 1840s and remained an objective for a 
hundred years (Christopher 2008, 271).  It followed the introduction in 1800 of ‘An act for 
taking an Account of the Population of Great Britain, and the Increase or Diminution thereof’, 
which directed the taking of a census of England and Wales in 1801.  It involved the first 
comprehensive, systematic and centralized collection of information on households and 
individuals. Previously, numerous local and central institutions and officials linked to the 
central state, such as ecclesiastical courts, justices of the peace and overseers of the poor, 
regularly collected information about people in their jurisdictions (Higgs 2004). The census, 
along with civil registration, replaced that which had been largely carried out by local 
administrations and dispersed across thousands of archives (parish chests, diocesan registers, 
estate papers). However, until 1841 censuses did not list individuals but instead provided 
simple head counts (numbers of men, women, families and houses) and information about 
household characteristics such as occupations and ages. The schedules were also completed by 
officers of the established church or of the poor law system who calculated totals from parish 
registers. The first nominal census was not conducted until 1841 by the newly established 
General Register Office (GRO), which initiated ‘the practice of instructing enumerators to hand 
out schedules to household heads for them to supply details of the members of their households 
on Census night’ (Higgs 2004, 72). However, while individuals were counted, unlike parish 
records the object was the population (Ruppert 2012) where individuals ‘are no longer pertinent 
as the objective, but simply as the instrument, relay, or condition for obtaining something at 
the level of population’ (Foucault 2007, 42).  
It is in relation to the centralised collection of data on individuals within the British state that 
the idea of an imperial census was enacted in 1821 with a Colonial Office requirement that 
each colonial government produce an annual statistical and informational Blue Book 
(Christopher 2008, 271). The same request specified that population be divided into white, free 
coloured, and slave categories. After the abolition of slavery in 1833 the categories were 
simplified into white and coloured. Although by the 1840s virtually all colonial governments 
had taken annual statistics, each developed divergent practices and produced incompatible 
annual Blue Books. To solve this fragmentation of information the Colonial Office in London 
developed the concept of a unified census of the British Empire. With the establishment of the 
General Register Office and the appointment of William Farr as Superintendent of Statistics, 
who served from 1839 to 1879, the idea of an imperial census was articulated (Christopher 
2008, 272). The General Register Office with the Superintendent of Statistics served as the 
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'centre of calculation' for the analysis, interpretation, collation, compilation and presentation of 
the imperial census. This is also when the quest began for dividing the colonies into coherent 
and comparable enumeration districts by following administrative divisions and boundaries, 
enumerating both settled and mobile populations, standardizing enumeration periods, counting 
indigenous populations differently, establishing a person's name as a unique identifier, and 
enumerating not only age and race but also occupation according to categories originally 
developed by William Farr (Christopher 2008, 273-274).  
The quest produced various censuses throughout the rest of the nineteenth century with myriad 
fits and starts and problems as well as resistances and non-compliances based on different 
grounds. Colonial Governors were required to explain not only divergences but also 
resistances. Regrettably, there is no systematic study of these divergences and resistances in 
the British colonies but an event in 1861 attests to such resistance and perhaps provides 
evidence of imperial responses. Ceylon avoided conducting the 1861 census and when asked 
an explanation the Governor simply gave that it was seen as a precursor to taxation, a response 
that was common in both metropole and colony (Ruppert 2014). Ten years later when Ceylon 
did conduct a census, its Governor was apparently compelled to reassure the power elite of the 
colony by stating that ‘the Census has no connection whatever with taxation but is taken solely 
for the purpose of ascertaining the number, ages and occupations of the inhabitants of the 
island. The information is required in order to ascertain whether or not the population of Ceylon 
are prosperous and increasing in number, and to enable the Government to devise measures for 
promoting the improvement of the country and the welfare of the people’ (Christopher 2008, 
276).   
As Christopher notes ‘the quest for a systematic synchronised population census of the British 
Empire lasted for a hundred years. It represented an attempt by the Colonial Office to obtain a 
view of the Empire as a whole as an aid to its efficient administration, although the precise use 
of the census was never explicitly stated’ (Christopher 2008, 284). He concludes that 
‘nevertheless, only one official integrated Report on the Census of the British Empire was ever 
published (2008, 284). Christopher thinks two significant factors contributed to this ‘failure’. 
First, although successive Registrars General of England and Wales periodically monitored the 
development of the project, the colony was always secondary to metropole. As such, the colony 
received only limited resources especially for processing the data collected (2008, 284).  
Second, which is important from our point of view, was that British Empire found it difficult 
to co-ordinate diverse, multiple, and relatively autonomous colonial governments (Christopher 
2008, 284). This is worth investigating further. To what extent colonial governments resisted 
an imperial census and to what extent this constituted on the part of colonial authorities gaining 
power-knowledge over their ‘own’ populations are questions that arise from the quest.  
Nonetheless, the quest for an imperial census that lasted a century attests to how counting, 
categorising, and ordering worked as technologies of colonial government and how these 
technologies were inherited, reshaped, and reused by postcolonial governments. We suggest 
that the transition from colonial to postcolonial governments involved considerable continuity 
of technologies of government, especially the use of data for counting, categorising, and 
ordering. The quest for a unified census of the British Empire between 1840 and 1940 produced 
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vast amounts of data but eventually became a failed project in the sense that James Scott 
defined the emergence of the state. Even if it eventually failed to accomplish its stated 
objectives the quest, with its trials, tribulations, ridges and troughs, produced an emerging  
logic of  imperial government. Additionally, the quest led to myriad other intentional or 
collateral effects such as the invention of new governmental practices, and bureaucratic and 
technological infrastructures.  Furthermore, although Christopher considers the census as 
‘stocktaking’ – as governments typically do - it is well to remember  James Scott’s conclusion 
(1999, 3): quests of mapping territory or enumerating population were not merely description 
exercises but are technologies of government that ‘… give [their] categories the force of law’. 
Moreover, it is well to remember Hacking’s distinction between overt and ‘subversive’ effects 
of the census. He says that the overt amassing of gigantic amounts of data rarely results in its 
intended effects. For Hacking ‘[t]he fetishistic collection of overt statistical data about 
populations has as its motto “information and control,” but it would more truly be 
“disinformation and mismanagement”’ (Hacking 2015, 281). Yet, Hacking says, ‘there is a 
quite unintended effect of enumerating, and I call this subversive. Enumeration demands kinds 
of thing; or people to count. Counting is hungry for categories. Many of the categories we now 
use to describe people are by-products of the needs of enumeration’ (Hacking 2015, 280). He 
concludes that ‘… biopolitics as the transition from the counting of hearths to the counting of 
bodies’ (which we noted above) follows from this. Thus, ‘the subversive effect of this transition 
was to create new categories into which people had to fall, and so to create and to render rigid 
new conceptualizations of the human being’ (Hacking 2015, 281).    
We see a century of quest to produce a census of an empire therefore not so much as a quest to 
describe it but as a quest to govern people in a different way. What drives the will to knowledge 
– the insatiable accumulation of data, classifications (race, ethnicity, language, religion), 
categorisations (caste, tribe, kin), interpretations (normal, abnormal, deserving, underserving, 
dangerous, useful), inferences, relations, processes, identifications – is the will to power: a 
force to maintain, nurture, sustain, and encourage capacities that are useful for the purposes for 
which there is an interest in the object. The census and its practices – collecting, collating, and 
presenting data and drawing conclusions about the population as an object – were not only for 
creating a coherent and consistent method – which always failed – but the will to know that 
satisfied the will to power. The more difficult it was to establish a coherent or consistent system 
the more driven was the will to know.  Yet this will to know was bound to exceed the 
technologies that afforded it: the census was increasingly surrounded by and indeed gave rise 
to various knowledge practices: ethnographies, comparisons, theories, interpretations, 
disagreements, and debates that veritably began creating an image of the colonial state and 
society. Census, or the attempts to create an imperial census, generated various forms of data 
and knowledge as well as agents and authorities who subsequently as experts developed 
autonomous interests and practices in data that created a condition of possibility for the birth 
of the postcolony.  
The development of the modern census throughout the nineteenth century is often told through 
methodological nationalism: a survey of nation-by-nation developments where each nation 
develops its legislative authority and administrative machinery and conceived of populations 
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as contained within national boundaries (Chernilo 2011, Dumitru 2014, Scheel et al. 2016, 
Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Yet the articulation of census standards is also an imperial 
development of a different order. Almost at the same time when European imperial states began 
to develop census practices an international field of data politics emerged where newly 
developed methods and techniques and their experts began to establish and compete in the 
development of protocols for international co-operation and standardisation. The First 
International Statistical Congress was held in Brussels in 1853 which adopted formal 
international recommendations for conducting a census urging comparability amongst various 
national censuses. In 1872, the International Statistical Institute met in St. Petersburg and 
adopted not only standards for conducting censuses but also methods and data (Goyer and 
Domschke 1983, 8). When the same institute met in 1897 the idea of a census of the whole 
world was articulated. Shortly after its formation following the second world war, in 1950, the 
United Nations (UN) defined one of its urgent tasks as the development of census methods and 
data standardization. Practically, this involved tweaking standards developed since the 1850s. 
It was not until 1970 that the UN developed its World Population Census Program (Goyer and 
Domschke 1983, 9). Since then the United Nations has progressively developed census 
guidelines to achieve greater standardisation across all states and regional organisations such 
as the European Commission have enacted statutes and regulations that comply with and extend 
these to achieve harmonised European data statistics.  Despite these efforts, the interpretation 
and implementation of standards has been uneven and variable due to a combination of 
political, technical and historical differences. As we noted in relation to the quest for an 
imperial census, effects of governmental logics are not reducible to their stated intentions and 
objectives but give rise to myriad collateral strategies, responses and effects.  
Notwithstanding this variability the will to know through censuses has performative effects 
including the emergence of its agents within a transnational field of statistics (Scheel et al. 
2016). The emergence of guilds of experts and star figures of statistics such as William Farr 
(1807-1883) signals only a glimpse of a veritable structure of expertise about both metropole 
and colonial populations and the interests of experts that were related yet by no means reducible 
to the interests of the old European empires and perhaps constituted a different empire – data’s 
empire – that secured and maintained its hold on colonial populations long after they had 
become postcolonial. As Hacking mused thirty-five years ago ‘it will be salutary if some of us 
go on noticing mutations within the more gradual expansion of the biopolitical empire’ (2015, 
281).  
This still remains a hypothesis, as it were, since there are not many studies on the attempt to 
create a British imperial census let alone relate it to imperial government. But new studies such 
as those by Karl Ittmann, Dennis Cordell, Gregory Maddox (Ittmann, Cordell, and Maddox 
2010) and their colleagues on attempts in Africa and by Jen Emigh, Dylan Riley, and Ahmed 
Patricia (Emigh, Riley, and Ahmed 2016) in Asia already indicate that Foucault’s hypotheses 
about government and population are bearing fruit – albeit with modifications and 
enhancements – for studying the imperial and colonial government of populations. We expect 
that these studies will grow and will form part of what we call ‘postcolonial data politics’ and 
enable us to better understand the relation between the production of colonial populations 
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through the  accumulation of data and imperial government. Meanwhile, we also think there is 
an urgent need for studies that examine contemporary data politics and its postcolonial 
implications. We now want to illustrate what we see as emerging areas of investigation in 
postcolonial data politics, which Hacking calls ‘biopolitical empire’ and which we recast as 
‘data’s empire’.  
Governing postcolonial peoples 
It is within the historic amassing of data that we approach the current ‘deluge’ of data (Hey and 
Trefethen 2003) – which now has come to be named ‘big data’ – to consider what bearing the 
constitutive powers of knowledge (of population, of territory, and of memory) has for this new 
era of data politics. The range and volume of data about populations and other objects being 
generated through the internet and myriad digital devices by organisations, agencies, 
corporations and governments is unprecedented. But beyond volume, data is also being remade 
in standardised forms that traverse national borders and with qualities that are increasingly 
granular, immediate, varied, and detailed. From Facebook claims that it can make a map of 
everyone in the world (Meyer 2016) and that it ‘reaches more people than the U.S. Census data 
says exist’ (Swant 2017) to Google Street View being proposed as an alternative for generating 
census statistics on socioeconomic characteristics (Gebru et al. 2017), there is no shortage of 
claims to knowledge. Arguably, no kingdom, state, empire, government, transnational or global 
organisation or corporation has ever held such command over the production, storage and 
analysis of data. The implications of these developments associated with big data have been 
mostly debated in relation to privacy, anonymity, security, speech and other concerns that are 
cast in terms appropriate to Euro-American metropoles. As we have argued above, just as 
metropole-colony relations were configured through the invention of biopolitics, we expect 
that new developments in big data are reconfiguring not only metropole-postcolony relations 
but also biopolitics. To put it differently, not only do the issues of concern such as privacy and 
security play out very differently in the metropole than in the postcolony but also agents of 
power-knowledge and their targets of government are also being constituted differently. 
Moreover, data politics are also playing out differently in the metropole and postcolony 
precisely because of different trajectories through which certain rights are protected, 
developed, or violated.  
All this is most evident in big data projects in Africa. African postcolonial states are said to 
face a longstanding ‘knowledge problem’ because of flawed development data on metrics such 
as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and economic development  (Jerven and Johnston 2015). 
Some African national statistical departments have more resources and stronger capacity and 
experience than others, such that development problems include the unevenness and often 
absence of ‘good’ statistical data (Jerven 2013). It is in this context that big data is imagined 
as an opportunity to know Africa and other postcolonial states in unprecedented ways, which 
are critical for decisions about development in areas such as healthcare, security, economic 
productivity, and disaster and resource management, and so on (Hilbert 2016).  
That is the promise reflected in the United Nations Global Pulse initiative, which is principally 
focused on adopting big data for monitoring and reaching sustainable development goals and 
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managing humanitarian action. The initiative was established based on the recognition that big 
data offers the opportunity to gain a better understanding of changes in human well-being, and 
to get real-time feedback on how well policy responses are working (United Nations 2018). It 
is ‘intended as a Call to Action to inspire development agencies and particularly evaluators to 
collaborate with data scientists and analysts in the exploration and application of new data 
sources, methods, and technologies’ for ‘programme monitoring, evaluation and learning’ 
(Bamberger 2016, 22). Global Pulse is only one of several initiatives involving projects that 
engage with either publicly available or big data donated by ‘large multinational corporations 
such as Orange and Twitter for purposes of monitoring and evaluating social or economic 
dynamics in LMICs' (Low and Medium Income Countries) (Taylor and Broeders 2015, 231). 
The initiative engages with and is part of a broad network of international researchers and 
organisations working with big data on development projects and who publish, discuss and 
circulate results, and share knowledge about interventions. 
More generally, Global Pulse is part of a ‘field of study’ referred to as ‘Information 
Communication Technologies for [international] Development’ – ICT4D – described as ‘an 
interdisciplinary practice that combines tech with international development, human rights, and 
public health’ to collect, store, process, analyze and share data for development (Anonymous 
2016). The kinds of data vary and can include everything from health care data to mobile phone 
metadata, sensor and biometric data and survey data.   
Projects involving big data analytics are undertaken as part of Global Pulse have included 
numerous experiments with mobile phone data such as the mapping of poverty in China using 
call data records and mapping population displacement in Nepal following the April 2015 
earthquake (Bamberger 2016, 41). Others include using social media to explore HIV-related 
stigma in Rio, guiding emergency services in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake, and 
detecting and managing forest and peat fires in Indonesia. One 2013 project involved the 
analysis of anonymised mobile phone data to visualise population movements in Senegal 
(Global Pulse 2015). Through the use of visualisations, a series of mobility profiles were 
produced for different regions to identify how changes in patterns of mobility could indicate 
changes in livelihoods or coping strategies, or exposure to new shocks. Monitoring such 
changes for vulnerable groups in ‘real time’ was identified as potentially offering a ‘powerful 
humanitarian early warning mechanism for informed decision-making and rapid response’ 
(Global Pulse 2015, 1). These are just a few amongst a large number of big data projects. 
While much has been made about the potential of these various forms of big data to finally 
‘know’ postcolonial populations, critics rightly point to the ‘politics, power dynamics and 
ongoing patterns of privilege and marginalization on a global scale’ of ICT4D initiatives and 
especially the lack of ethical processes such as informed consent and opt-out procedures that 
‘continue the legacy of colonialism within aid work’ (Anonymous 2016).  They argue that 
many projects in the postcolony lack data protection for personally identifiable data, which 
would be unacceptable in the metropole where the governments or corporations that own and 
control data are located. These practices mean ‘there is a danger of setting up a form of 
imperialism based on personal data. Just as the royal powers of old reached far into the lives 
of distant colonized people, technology companies gain immense control with every terabyte 
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of personal data they store and analyze’ (Simmons 2015). For Simmons, technology companies 
that are predominantly owned and located in the United States are colonial in their actions as 
they perform like sovereign nations and increasingly operate across borders.  
The reach of these practices, however, extends to both metropole and postcolonial populations 
and thus they need to be understood, as we argued above, in relation to each other. That is, 
technology companies operate transnationally to harvest the data people generate in their day-
to-day lives through a form of ‘accumulation by dispossession that colonizes and commodifies 
everyday life in ways previously impossible’ (Thatcher, O’Sullivan, and Mahmoudi 2016, 
990). Thatcher et al. interpret this through the metaphor of ‘data colonialism’ to highlight ‘the 
power asymmetries inherent in contemporary forms of data commodification.’  However, just 
as censuses and other forms of state produced data were uneven in their colonisation, big data 
are leading to a ‘new kind of digital divide’ in ‘data-based knowledge’ due to the unevenness 
of technological diffusion as a result of ‘lack of infrastructure, human capital, economic 
resource availability and institutional frameworks’ (Hilbert 2016, 135). Beyond these 
‘contextual’ variables, just as in colonization, the varying assemblages of experts, methods, 
technologies, data, organisations, guilds, associations, practices, authorities, and other interests 
are constitutive of uneven effects beyond the control of the technology companies. 
For these reasons, while these critiques are apt the situation is more complex. Importantly for 
our argument, they do not capture what we suggest is the continuity and discontinuity from the 
regulatory logic of biopolitics that characterised data politics of the last two centuries and was 
concerned with population as a species-body.  We thus refer to ‘data’s empire’ to signal an 
emergent regime of government that involves new as well as existing mechanisms of 
domination between the metropole and postcolony that is producing a species-body with 
different characteristics and with heterogeneous effects. These characteristics are yet to be fully 
investigated. What we offer below is thus a preliminary outline of emergent mechanisms that 
are distinct and overlapping and have continuities and breaks from past ones. We then discuss 
their potential implications for the biopolitics of our present.  
The species-body is re-assembled. Numerous actors and arrangements (technologies, practices, 
data, methods, agencies, authorities, professions, and so on) make up data’s empire. Beyond 
the ‘public–private partnerships’ and ‘growing agency of corporations as development actors’ 
(Taylor and Broeders 2015, 229), various combinations of actors that traverse both national 
borders and public-private sectors are engaged in the production of the species-body. They 
involve states, agencies, organizations, corporations, and institutions that come together to 
process data for different purposes of government. ICT4D projects, for example, are funded by 
governments and nongovernmental organizations (e.g., UN), corporations, private foundations, 
and private individuals. Many involve collaborations between government and non-
government organisations and various professions such as statisticians and data scientists. 
Examples include a project that analysed financial transaction data of the BBVA bank to 
measure the economic resilience of populations to natural disasters in Mexico and another used 
satellite imagery data produced by various governments to track poverty trends in Uganda 
(Bamberger 2016). Significantly, the agents of these assemblages occupy relative positions 
within the transnational field that includes professionals such as data scientists, statisticians, 
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programmers, software developers, methodologists and so on who traverse transnational and 
national borders (Scheel et al. 2016). Rather than state authorities being replaced or superseded 
by corporations or private sector actors, the fields of power and knowledge and the agents and 
practices that make them up are being diversified and recomposed. Furthermore, numerous 
projects such as those of Global Pulse are not separate from but part of this transnational field 
that engages with big data in the metropole. Just as a quest for an imperial census happened 
simultaneously to the development of national modern censuses, so too are quests to know 
populations through big data happening transnationally.  
This is one reason we suggest that the species-body is re-assembled. Its production includes 
various combinations of technologies such as the hardware of computers but also sensors, 
satellites, antennas and mobile devices and beyond software to include analytics such as 
algorithms, AI, machine learning, and cloud computing. These different combinations of 
sources and technologies traverse borders and fields as do the data they produce. Mobile phone 
data, for example, is produced in myriad contexts and taken up and combined with other data 
to enact phenomena such as migration flows, disaster responses, and economic well-being 
(Tazzioli 2018). More generally, millions of data points can be assembled on several hundred 
variables related to a topic of interest such as an individual’s transactions, weather patterns, 
and social media postings. Many data sources can be brought together into a ‘high-dimensional 
space’ that envelopes and flattens differences between data (Mackenzie 2015, 434).  In these 
ways, rather than replacing existing data regimes, myriad data are combined from a 
‘continuum’ that includes ‘big data’ (digital transactions, social media, sensors, etc.), ‘large 
data’ (census, survey, administrative, etc.) and ‘small data’ (qualitative interviews, focus 
groups, etc.) (Bamberger 2016, 39). 
So, while the imperial quest for a census sought to colonise through standardised and pre-
defined methods and data organised and managed principally by imperial states, data’s empire 
consists of a proliferation of data that is produced in ways that are dispersed and distributed 
(Ruppert, Law, and Savage 2013). Data can move and circulate between different sites of 
production and be ‘repurposed’, that is, used for generating knowledge to serve governing 
objectives sometimes far removed from that for which the data were originally produced. Call 
data records of mobile phone operators for instance are repurposed to know changes in the 
livelihoods of a population and can be done so across spaces not confined to territorial borders 
and in relatively standardised, comparable and interoperable formats.  That is, the data of the 
transnational field is standardised in ways not previously attained or even attainable by 
previous data regimes. 
The species-body is multiple. This multiplication does not merely constitute ‘new’ 
representations of ‘old’ populations. The multiplication of assemblages also multiplies the 
object, the species-body.  To understand the species-body as multiple is to first understand data 
as a performative entity: it does not merely describe but produces the objects it represents. It is 
for this reason data can be understood as an actant within assemblages for what they might 
perform changes depending on the relations they enter and through which they have agentic 
qualities. What data perform is brought into being by assemblages of experts, methods, 
technologies, data, organisations, guilds, associations, practices, authorities, and other interests 
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but it is never under the strict control of any of them. It is through its circulation and 
repurposing that data are detached from the assemblages that make them up and come to act 
on and colonise objects as well as subjects in myriad ways. 
The species-body is performed. Multiplication engenders subversive effects.  If the massive 
efforts of the British Empire over a century failed to produce an imperial census it did succeed 
in producing colonial populations and institutionalising ways of representing, measuring, 
counting, and acting on them. And as Hacking argued, a subversive effect of such enumerations 
was the making of categories that rendered ‘rigid new conceptualisations of the human being.’ 
The subversive effects of data’s empire today supplement this logic of categorisation as a 
governing strategy to colonise individual and population bodies but differently. Conventional 
population statistics typically involve sociodemographic categories and then collecting data 
through usually self-elicited accounts that use various methods to fit people into them. While 
this logic persists, the repurposing of big data involves analytics that identify categories and 
classifications of populations rather than imposing them in advance. Categories on mobility or 
economic health are generated as a consequence of analytics such as machine learning that do 
not identify associations between a limited set of existing variables, but explore multi-
dimensional patterns amongst ‘hundreds and in some cases tens of thousands of variables and 
sample sizes of millions or billions data’ (Mackenzie 2015, 434). Differences are not 
understood as ‘variables’ as in classical statistics, but derived from combinations of attributes 
or ‘features’ from myriad ‘forms of data (text, images, video, transactions, sensors), not just 
the variables measured using classical statistical tabulations of surveys, polls or random 
sampling’ (Mackenzie 2015, 433). For these reasons, Mackenzie argues these analytics involve 
a different mode of knowing differences through classification, which involves ‘the 
generalization of prediction’. That is, while predictive modelling is not new and indeed part of 
all regimes of power/knowledge, the innovation is its expansion to incorporate not only large 
volumes of data but a wide range of features or attributes (e.g., transactional data, social media 
posts, weather readings) within a generalised space to find ‘useful approximations’ (Mackenzie 
2015, 435).  In development projects, this is expressed as the creation of ‘standardized data 
categories into which many different types/sets of information can be fitted so that data are 
comparable over time and space’ (Bamberger 2016, 38). 
While features or variables can be diverse, a key difference from the conventional statistical 
production of population is the registering of multiple forms of conduct or what people do such 
as their movements and actions (transactions, choices, statements, interactions) where the focus 
of inquiry is not on the individual factors that affect conduct, but on aggregate patterns and 
connections: contagion, influence, association, etc. (Ruppert, Law, and Savage 2013).  It is the 
continuous tracing of the conduct of the species-body that analytics of mobility, sentiment or 
transactions are based. The species-body is thus a performing body that is not stable but always 
becoming. For example, in the Senegal project, an algorithm grouped individuals within 
different livelihood zones according to their movement trajectories throughout a year to reveal 
distinct mobility patterns and groupings (Bamberger 2016, 1).  
The species-body is visualised. The species-body is not only multiple and enacted. It is also 
visualised. As Edward Tufte (1983) famously insisted, visualisation can be a technique ‘for 
15 
 
reasoning about statistical information’ (9) that ‘reveals data’ and can be more ‘precise than 
conventional statistical computations’ (13). Now with millions of data points, visualisation has 
become a key technique of making data visible and forms ‘part of the toolkit that data miners 
and data scientists employ to navigate, transform or otherwise explore data’ (Mackenzie 2015, 
437).   
Visualisations can identify patterns previously unseen and include interactive elements and 
dashboards that enable seeing the effects of combining different data on features of a 
population (Bamberger 2016). In the Senegal project, data on monthly rainfall for each 
livelihood zone could be incorporated at ‘different geographical and temporal resolutions using 
remote sensing data from NASA’ to visualise the impact on population movements (Global 
Pulse 2015, 2). Beyond representation, visualisation is thus also an analytic that makes it 
possible to detect and observe the species-body. Unlike the maps documented by Anderson, 
visualisation reveals populations as patterns, trends and tendencies immanent in the species-
body as a changing being.  
The species-body is alive. Combined together, the multiplicity, performativity, agency and 
subversive effects of data render it uncontrollable by a central authority yet manageable 
because of the possibilities of detecting the species-body and then calibrating the conduct of 
the individual body. It is this last aspect of data that best signifies what we mean by ‘data’s 
empire’. Rather than the periodic ‘stocktaking’ of conventional statistics, populations are living 
bodies that have pulses, flows, and patterns.  In turn, data serves a dual function: for identifying 
attributes or features (e.g., sentiments about the economy) but then monitoring and evaluating 
those features over time (e.g., daily changes in sentiments about the economy) and then 
intervening through specific governing projects. The former engages data in much the same 
way as classical data regimes:  populations as entities to be measured. However, the latter is 
what big data makes possible: the potential to monitor and evaluate the performance of the 
species-body on a more continuous basis. It is a logic captured in four stages of data analytics:  
descriptive and exploratory analysis (what is happening, often in real-time); doing predictive 
analytics (‘what is likely to happen’); detection (‘tracking who is likely to succeed and who 
will fail’); and evaluation and data diagnostics (‘how to improve programme performance’) 
(Bamberger 2016, 60-61). What these four stages capture is how data performs the relation 
between sovereign, disciplinary and regulatory logics. In the Senegal project, rather than 
evaluating using historic survey data, real-time information of trends and changes in mobility 
provide ‘early warning of emerging vulnerabilities’ thereby enabling rapid response 
(Bamberger 2016, 1). Response then is at the project level and involves humanitarian 
interventions to address shocks to livelihoods, for example.  In other cases, it can involve 
targeting conducts (mobility, violence, education) to discipline and regulate individual bodies. 
Furthermore, the relation between stages is understood as cyclical and involves complex 
relations and ‘feedback loops’ between monitoring, evaluation and interventions.  In relation 
to prediction, Mackenzie (2015) notes that big data analytic models are based on the 
assumption that relatively stable classifications exist. Yet, the performativity of prediction 
means that these are mutable and thus models must frequently be changed to maintain their 
predictive power (Mackenzie 2015, 442). For these reasons, the species-body is not measured 
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but calibrated where governing programmes and projects need to be  ‘smart, agile and adaptive’ 
(Bamberger 2016).  
Decolonising data’s empire  
When placed within both longer and shorter series of developments in biopolitics and its allied 
technologies (statistics, demography, census), more recent developments in predictive 
analytics, algorithms, machine learning and the like begin to appear in a different light. The 
latter are not recent or simply technical developments but belong to a series of long- and short-
duration transformations since the end of the eighteenth century that inaugurate, supplant, and 
supplement ways and logics of governing peoples. It is important to place these ways and logics 
into historical series to understand what is enduring and what is changing. If indeed modern 
logics of governing the Euro-American metropoles were implicated in governing colonial 
populations in ways that we have yet to understand, how is the species-body performed today 
by a combination of technologies of big data, large data, and small data? If the species-body is 
now reassembled, multiple, performed, visualised, and alive in ways that were inconceivable a 
generation ago how does this inaugurate new logics of governing peoples? How does it 
reconfigure metropole-colony and metropole-postcolony relations? And in turn, with what 
governing effects? 
Like the ‘failed’ British imperial census, the will to know the species-body of the world by 
organisations such as the United Nations and its regional commissions experience resistance 
through the uneven interpretation and implementation of standards, and varying practices and 
data production regimes in both the metropole and the postcolony. In part this is a consequence 
of practices being caught within national approaches and contexts and their variable capacities 
and investments.  What does this mean for the regulatory logic of biopolitics and with what 
subversive effects for how people are categorised and how populations are constituted as 
objects of governing? We articulated this question through a discussion of some contemporary 
practices of international organisations and how they are mobilising big data to address 
limitations in past efforts to produce data about and to know postcolonial populations. We 
argue that the continuity between these efforts and quests to do an imperial census of the British 
Empire becomes more prominent and apparent in postcolonial states that have been drawn into 
the orbit of ‘development’ discourses with the increasing involvement of technology 
companies that both spur and produce data needs for government. Unlike conventional 
empires, however, which are still in operation through various practices, data’s empire 
functions through assemblages of actors, arrangements, technologies, and logics that are 
transversal: neither their practices nor objects of government are confined or limited a given 
territory and its security. That the species-body is multiple, performed, visualised, and alive 
means it has acquired qualities that, unlike conventional vital statistics, measure vital signs of 
populations, as the increasing use of the terms ‘pulse’ and ‘sense’ indicate.  
We are not yet ready to name and add these mechanisms as a fourth regime to Foucault's trilogy 
– sovereignty, discipline, and regulation. We suggest these mechanisms indicate an emergent 
logic of how population knowledge about the species-body is being enacted. While these 
mechanisms have been variously identified by other researchers, we have sought to bring them 
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together in relation to identifying them as part of an emerging logic. We don’t think this logic 
supplants or displaces sovereignty, discipline, or regulation but it is a key logic that is emerging 
within contemporary data regimes. For us data's empire is unlike early modern and modern 
Euromerican empires yet it inherits logics of government from them and institutes these new 
mechanisms of power and principles of knowledge. 
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